One of the most important goals of neuroscience is to establish precise structure-function relationships in the brain.
Introduction
This review article is an attempt to discuss a traditional goal of neuroscience, the characterization of the relation between structure and function in the brain, from the perspective of general system theory (von Bertalanffy, 1969) . The article starts with an overview of causal and correlative approaches in neuroscience towards the investigation of structure -function relationships (SFRs) in neural systems. Introducing a few simple concepts from general system theory, some formal implications for the investigation of SFRs in neural systems are derived.
These implications are then evaluated in the context of functional neuroimaging. I will argue that classic applications of functional neuroimaging are insufficient to provide insights into SFRs and need to be complemented by principled models of neural systems that properly reflect the connectional structure of the system as well as the bridging principles from structure to function. One of the most useful ways of expressing these bridging principles is in terms of effective connectivity. Several models of effective connectivity are introduced and their strengths and limitations are discussed.
Many of the ideas expressed in this article are not novel and have been expressed in similar ways before (e.g. Horwitz et al. 1999; McIntosh, 2000; Friston, 2002) .
What this article hopes to contribute, however, is a generic perspective on models of SFRs in neural systems that is derived from basic principles of general system theory. A further aim of this article is to lend support to the current transformation of neuroimaging from a field using exploratory analyses and data-driven interpretations of the results to a hypothesis-led, model-based discipline that gradually merges with computational neuroscience in order to provide mathematical descriptions of SFRs in the brain.
Although I believe that neural systems cannot be understood without formal mathematical models, I have tried to keep the mathematical descriptions simple, in the hope that those neuroscientists who have not had much exposure to mathematical models of neural systems will find the material accessible. All models discussed here are essentially linear models at the level of larger brain regions (e.g. cortical areas) and do not require a sophisticated knowledge of mathematics to understand them. Furthermore, to present general concepts in a tutorial style, I have expanded on some issues that may appear unnecessarily detailed for readers with experience in system analysis. The latter readers are referred to mathematically more advanced texts on neural system modelling as found, for example, in Friston (2003) , Jirsa (2004) or Dayan & Abott (2001) .
Causal and correlative SFRs
One of the classic goals of neuroscience is to describe SFRs. There is a wide range of well-known examples from different organizational levels of the brain that can be found in any standard textbook on neuroscience.
For example, some general functional properties of neurons can be directly explained from the molecular structure of certain ion channels, e.g. the absolute refractory period is a direct consequence of the molecular structure of the sodium channel. The functional differences between magno-and parvocellular neurons throughout the visual system are partially dependent on the different geometry of their dendritic trees, and the topology of fibre systems is sufficient to explain some basic neurophysiological findings such as the contralateral cortical representation of a peripherally presented visual stimulus as well as some clinically rather complex syndromes like the Brown-Séquard syndrome.
These examples are chosen more or less arbitrarily and could be replaced by many others. What is common to all of them is that the formulated SFR expresses a direct causal role of structure for function: 'The brain component C has the functional property F because of its structural property S.' However, many questions in neuroscience are not easily addressed in this fashion. For example, at the level of cortical areas analogous causal definitions of SFRs have proven to be much more difficult. This is not simply due to a lack of knowledge: for many cortical areas, we have an exquisite understanding of the anatomical microstructure and have observed its functional responses under many different combinations of sensory stimulation and cognitive context. Yet, there does not seem to be a single area for which we are able to deduce its functional properties in a direct and causal fashion from its microstructural properties. One obvious explanation for this is the increase in complexity. First, many areas appear to be involved in more than one cognitive function (at least at the level of psychological nomenclature). This has been observed for low-level areas such as V1, which takes part in very different aspects of visual information processing (Lee, 2003) , as well as for high-level areas such as Broca's area in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which has been shown to be involved in functional contexts as diverse as language processing, action observation and local visual search (Hamzei et al. 2003; Manjaly et al. 2003 Manjaly et al. , 2004 . Second, in order to explain the observed functional range, we may need to take into account several microstructural variables at once (e.g. neuronal cell types, cyto-and myeloarchitecture, and receptor distributions). Additionally, we may need to consider potential interactions between these structural variables, e.g. the way in which neuronal cell type determines areal function is likely to depend on the intrinsic microcircuitry of the area (Lund, 2002) . In other words, determining causal SFRs for cortical areas is a multivariate problem that requires a model of the interactions between the structural variables. Third, functional responses in cortical areas are highly contextsensitive, e.g. they depend on the previous processing history as well as on the nature of the inputs provided by other brain regions . For example, the responses of neurons in many visual areas can be drastically altered by changes in cognitive set or attention (Luck et al. 1997; Li et al. 2004) . Therefore, any attempt to explain SFRs in cortical areas must be able to account for such context dependencies, which are observed ubiquitously (Albright & Stoner, 2002) . Finally, and most importantly, because no cortical area operates in isolation but is connected to a large number of other areas by anatomical long-range connections (so-called association fibres), the functional behaviour of a particular area cannot be explained by its local microstructure only. Indeed, strong changes of the neural responses in various areas have been reported after a particular input from a remote area was experimentally abolished (Hupe et al. 1998) or enhanced (Moore & Armstrong, 2003) .
Therefore, the structure of the connectional pattern with other areas has to be taken into account when formulating a hypothesis on the SFR of a given area.
In general terms, for any given component of the brain the definition of causal SFRs becomes more difficult (1) the more complex the structure of this component, (2) the more complex its functional range and, most importantly, (3) the less isolatable and contextindependent it is (i.e. the more interactions it has with other components). In other words, how easily causal SFRs can be established depends on whether one needs to adopt an explicit systems perspective. This issue is one of the core problems of the general scientific inquiry (von Bertalanffy, 1969) and will be addressed in more detail below. In the case of cortical areas, as demonstrated above, a systems perspective appears mandatory for unravelling causal SFRs because cortical areas not only have a complex internal structure and subserve complex functions that are highly context-dependent, but are also densely connected among each other (and with subcortical structures) through association fibres.
Historically, the difficulties in establishing causal SFRs for cortical areas have had considerable consequences.
In cognitive neuroscience, the mechanistic view that underlies SFRs in the strict sense has largely been exchanged for a black box perspective where the aim is merely to state which areas (defined by intrinsic structural homogeneity in terms of neuron types, microcircuitry and external connections) are consistently observed to be involved in a certain functional context. In other words, major parts of neuroscience have been aiming at the more modest goal of merely establishing correlations between structure and function. Since the 19th century, much interdisciplinary work has been devoted to establishing such structure-function correlations (SFCs) for cortical areas. This required (1) a parcellation of the cortex into distinct areas and (2) methods for measuring the involvement of these entities in a given function. The structural basis of this endeavour was (and still is) delivered by neuroanatomy in the form of cortical parcellation schemes that are based on microstructural critera, using cyto-, myelo-and /or receptor-architectonics (e.g. Brodmann, 1909; Vogt & Vogt, 1919; von Bonin & Bailey, 1947; Zilles et al. 2002) . Modern atlases provide probabilistic information about the spatial location of cortical areas in reference to a population of parcellated brains (Amunts et al. 2000) . The methods for establishing the involvement of a given area in a certain cognitive function have traditionally been provided both by neurophysiology (e.g. using invasive recordings from animals) and by neuropsychology (which explores cognitive deficits after lesions to one or several areas).
Both neurophysiological and neuropsychological techniques for exploring the functional role of a given area do, however, have severe limitations. For example, invasive recordings, with the exception of a very special and small population of patients, are ethically restricted to animals. Furthermore, they are methodologically constrained in that they usually only allow one to assess a small patch of cortex, and usually only test for very few functions. Neuropsychological studies of brain lesions also suffer from major problems of interpretation. First, brain lesions are rarely confined to a single area but often spread across large parts of the cortex and can also affect fibre tracts in the white matter. Second, the brain is extraordinarily plastic, and the occurrence of compensatory mechanisms can render the relation between a spatially specific lesion and loss of function opaque. Third, given that cortical areas are densely interconnected with each other, lesioning of areas can lead to widespread and complex effects in the cortical network. A striking example is given by paradoxical lesion effects in which a cognitive function that was compromised after a first lesion is largely restored after a second lesion (Sprague, 1966; Lomber et al. 2002) . Experimental lesion studies in animals and theoretical models have demonstrated that a correct interpretation of the functional consequences of lesions requires knowledge about the connectivity of the lesioned area (Payne et al. 1996; Young et al. 2000) .
About 20 years ago, positron emission tomography (PET) became available as a new method to determine SFCs, followed by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in the early 1990s. By measuring changes of regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) and blood oxygenlevel-dependent (BOLD) signals, respectively, PET and fMRI offer non-invasive, whole-brain, high-resolution measurements of regionally specific changes of brain activity that are correlated with certain components of a cognitive task. Therefore, these techniques promised to revolutionize the search for SFCs as they overcome many of the problems associated with invasive recordings and lesion studies discussed above. Indeed, since their introduction the number of SFCs described for cortical areas has exploded. Today, at least one functional label seems to have been proposed for each cortical region. There is no doubt that the use of the correlative approach has generated a lot of useful information about which areas are potential elements of the neural systems for implementing particular cognitive processes. Currently, however, this approach appears to have reached saturation point. There are two main reasons for this. The first is an increasing tension between the implicit tendency towards localizationist interpretations of neuroimaging results, and the diversity of findings that appear to contradict the idea of one-to-one relations between specific cortical areas and specific cognitive functions. Secondly, and more importantly, although ever longer lists of observed correlations between structural entities and cognitive processes are being produced, there is only very modest, if any, progress in our understanding of the causal mechanisms that underlie these correlations.
In this article I argue that, in order to provide us with a deeper understanding of SFRs in the brain, functional neuroimaging will need to adopt an explicit systems perspective, using causal models of brain function that are based on neuroanatomical information about the structure of the investigated system, particularly with regard to the connectivity between areas. First I briefly review general system theory and its importance for biological questions, focusing on how its principles can be applied to neuroscientific questions. Then I summarize the current conceptual and methodological foundations of neuroimaging and explain their relation to systems theory. I distinguish 'functional specialization' approaches from those that emphasize the role of causal interactions between separate areas, i.e. models of effective connectivity. Finally I discuss several neuroimaging studies, where the usefulness of system models based on effective connectivity becomes particularly evident.
General system theory

The significance of general system theory for scientific investigations
The central goal of most scientific disciplines is to understand systems, i.e. ensembles of interacting elements.
Today, this statement sounds almost trivial, yet the scientific focus on the systems concept has been estab- (Wiener, 1948) , which was introduced by Norbert Wiener (1948) and advanced by Ross Ashby (1956) .
Today, biology uses the systems concept to address questions at all levels of resolution: molecular (e.g. the interactions between different genes mediated by the proteins they encode), cellular (e.g. the functional integration of different populations of neurons), within a given organ (e.g. the instantiation of cognitive functions by the interaction of different cortical areas), between different organs (e.g. endocrine mechanisms of regulation between hypothalamus, hypophyseal gland and peripheral glands) and between entire organisms (e.g. in ecology or population biology). The omnipresence of the systems concept in biology and most other sciences is so strong that a recent special issue of the journal Science on 'Systems Biology' confirmed von Bertalanffy's (1969) previous diagnosis:
' The [systems] concept has pervaded all fields of science and penetrated into popular thinking, jargon, and mass media' (Chong & Ray, 2002) .
But what exactly is needed to speak of a 'system' and why is the systems concept so useful for framing scientific questions? A general, yet informal, definition is that a system is a set of elements that interact with each other in a spatially and temporally specific fashion.
Before we attempt a more formal definition, let us remind ourselves that one of the classic principles of scientific inference is to 'analyse' a given phenomenon, i.e. to break it down into atomic units and processes that can be investigated independently of each other.
This approach is appealing because it reduces a complex problem to a set of simpler problems, each of which can be addressed under conditions where it is easier to control for potentially confounding influences. For example, the kinetics of a biochemical process mediated by a certain enzyme can be studied in isolation, measuring the rate of transformation under different conditions. Having studied a set of different biochemical processes separately in this fashion, however, one would still not be able to predict quantitatively what their collective dynamics is like when these processes happen simultaneously in a shared environment, e.g. within a living organism.
This uncertainty is due to the fact that the different processes may interact, e.g. one process may change the substrate/product ratio of another process, or the efficacy of an enzyme that is relevant for a particular process may change due to the presence of allosteric (in)activators that are produced by a second process or due to dynamic changes in gene expression mediated by a third process. In a similar fashion, isolating a neuron from the system in which it naturally participates (e.g. by growing it in a dish) allows one to measure its response spectrum to experimentally controlled inputs.
However, this response spectrum may look very different if observed in the real system depending on the temporal structure of inputs from other neurons, presence of modulatory transmitters, metabolic interactions with glial cells, etc. As a third and different example, but which converges onto the same kind of problem, many principles of thermodynamics in physics are explicitly restricted to an isolated (autonomous) system, i.e. a closed ensemble of elements that is not perturbed by any kind of structured input from its outside. For an isolated system, the second principle of thermodynamics states that over time entropy will increase to a maximum. This precludes the existence of ordered structure in the system (e.g. with regard to the spatial distribution of the system elements). However, most natural phenomena show a remarkable degree of order and organization. This is because they result from open (non-autonomous) systems that receive temporally structured inputs from their environment.
For example, the spatio-temporal structure of brain activity is partially dependent on inputs from the external world that enter the brain through sensory interfaces.
In summary, the general problem of analytical procedures in science is that they usually do not allow one to reconstruct the behaviour of the whole system because, on their own, they are blind to predicting the consequences arising from interactions between the atomic elements and processes studied in isolation. As a consequence, analytical procedures need to be complemented with a theoretical framework that can be used to understand and predict the dynamics of the system as a whole. This framework is provided by general system theory.
A formal perspective on systems and their SFRs
As explained above, statements on causal SFRs are usually quite difficult to derive if the phenomenon of interest must be investigated from a systems perspective. In practice, the necessity to adopt a formal systems As demonstrated by the seminal analyses of Felleman & Van Essen (1991) and Young (1992) , however, individual connections are not sufficient to understand structural or functional properties of a given system without formally analysing its entire connectivity pattern.
If one does not try to ignore the necessity for formal system analyses in neuroscience, but embraces this perspective, powerful new insights on SFRs become possible. First of all, as will be demonstrated below, a formal definition of a system allows one to pinpoint, in conceptual and mathematical terms, what is meant precisely by structure, function and SFR. Second, it is the only way to express the SFR in quantitative terms such that predictions become possible for situations in which the system has not been observed before. Third, it is the only way to understand fully how a system works; this is a necessity to investigate in an informed manner how system function could be restored if some of its components are rendered dysfunctional, e.g. by disease ).
Informally, as mentioned above, a system is generally defined as a set of elements that interact with each other in a spatially and temporally specific fashion.
Structure refers to all static, i.e. time-invariant, components and relations of a given system. In analogy, function refers to all those dynamic, i.e. time-variant, components and relations of the system that are conditional on structure. From that it follows that the SFR is defined by the nature of this conditionality.
In the remainder of this section, I describe how these informal definitions can be given a mathematical form.
Readers lacking a mathematical background should move to section 4.2.
As a mathematical framework, a set of differential equations with time-invariant parameters is chosen; this formulation follows the early proposal by von Bertalanffy (1950) regarding how systems could generally be formalized, and can be easily extended to cover a whole range of special cases. However, differential equations are not the only possible mathematical representation of dynamic systems though. There are multiple alternatives, including iterative maps and cellular automata to name just two options (see Bar-Yam, 1997 ). The underlying concept, however, is always the same: a system can be defined by a set of n elements that have time-variant properties that interact with each other. Each time-variant property This touches on an important distinction: in system construction (e.g. in engineering), the state variables and their mutual dependencies are usually known; in system identification (e.g. when trying to understand a biological system), however, they are not known. This means that we always require a model of the system that represents our current hypothesis of system structure and function. This point will become important later on when we address applications of system-based approaches to functional neuroimaging.
As mentioned above, the crucial point is that the state variables interact with each other, i.e. the change of any state variable depends on the value of at least one other state variable. This mutual functional dependence between the properties of the elements in the system is expressed in a very natural fashion by a set of ordinary differential equations:
(2) Rewriting Eq. (2) as a function of the state vector leads to the compact statement that the change in the system's state depends on its current state:
However, this description is not yet sufficient. First of all, the specific form of the dependencies f i needs to be specified, which requires a set of parameters θ and, second, in the case of no-nautonomous systems (which are those of interest to biology and neuroscience) we need to consider the input into the system, e.g. sensory information entering the brain. We represent the set of all m known inputs by the m -vector function u ( t ). Altogether, this leads to a general state equation for non-autonomous systems:
where θ 1 , … , θ n are the parameter vectors of the individual dependencies f i , and θ is the overall (concatenated) parameter vector of the system. Such a model provides a causal description of how system dynamics results from system structure, because (1) it describes when and where external inputs enter the system, and (2) how the state changes induced by these inputs evolve in time depending on the system's structure, i.e. its connectivity pattern and any time-invariant property of the system elements and the connections between them (e.g. time constants).
It is important to note that I have made several assumptions to simplify the exposition. First, the description above assumes that all processes in the system are deterministic, i.e. the equations do not account for random processes (noise). Second, we assume that we know the inputs that enter the system. In neuroimaging, this is a tenable assumption because the inputs are experimentally controlled variables such as changes in stimuli or instructions. Third, the inputs to the system
are assumed to be independent and not to interact. In the case of interacting inputs, u ( t ) itself could be expressed as a set of differential equations in analogy to Eq. (2).
Fourth, we have neglected the possibility that changes in system state may depend on its recent history; see Friston (2000a) for an elegant model of general brain function that incorporates this mechanism in the form of 'neuronal transients'. Fifth, and most importantly, we assume that both the mathematical form of the dependencies f i and the parameters θ are time-invariant. This assumption is valid for systems whose structure does not change during the time of observation.
On the basis of the general system description provided by Eq. (4) we are now in a position to state more accurately what we mean by structure, function and SFRs in a system, or more precisely, in a model of a system:
• Structure is defined by the time-invariant components of the system model, i.e. θ and the mathematical form of the state variable dependencies f i .
• Function refers to those time-variant components of the system model that are conditional on its structure, i.e. x ( t ), but not u ( t ).
• The SFR is represented by F : its integration describes how system dynamics results from system structure.
More specifically, integrating F in time determines the temporal evolution of the system state x from the onset of an input u (0) (i.e. at time t = 0) up to a time point τ , given a known or assumed initial state x (0) (see Bossel, 1992, pp. 95, 397) : (5) In other words, once the system structure (i.e. θ and the form of f i ) is specified and a particular temporal sequence of inputs u ( t ) is chosen, Eq. (5) provides a complete description of how the functional behaviour of the system (i.e. its dynamics, the trajectory of the state vector x in time) results from its structure and initial state. Notably, the system structure determines both intrinsically sustained dynamics in the absence of inputs and dynamics enforced by external inputs.
Without going into details, it should be mentioned that there exists an approximation to Eq. (5) by means of Volterra series that has proven very useful for practical applications to neural systems (Rieke et al. 1997; Friston & Büchel, 2000; Friston et al. , 2003 .
All the equations presented so far are extremely general, and F , representing the SFR of the system, could be an arbitrarily complex non-linear function. To illustrate the definitions of structure, function and SFR in more detail, we discuss the case of a system with a linear SFR.
Although most natural phenomena are of a non-linear nature, linear system models play an outstanding role in systems science because (1) they are analytically tractable, and (2) given sufficiently long observation periods and non-negligible external input, their dynamics is largely independent of the initial state (Bossel, 1992, p. 386) .
Therefore, non-linear systems are often investigated in restricted subspaces of interest, using linear models as local approximations. The following model is a prototypical description of a non-autonomous system in which the dynamics can be separated into a linear intrinsic component (the interactions between its n elements) and a linear extrinsic component ( m external inputs):
As Eq. (6) shows, in this system model the change of any given element depends on the state of all other elements in the system and on external inputs that affect it directly or indirectly through connected elements. The SFR of this system can be written in compact matrix form as (7) where the non-zero values of A and C represent the parameters of the system (i.e. θ in Eq. 4) and the functional behaviour of the system at time point τ can be obtained by integration (compare Eq. 5): (8) where e At is the matrix exponential (see Bossel, 1992, pp. 364, 377) .
In this model, the system's behaviour has two separable components: intrinsically sustained dynamics (parameter matrix A ) and dynamics enforced by external inputs (parameter matrix C ). In terms of the general system equation (Eq. 4), this corresponds to θ = { A , C }.
The first term of Eq. (7) says that the change of the state variable x i is a linear mixture of all state variables in the system, weighted by the parameters a ij . Importantly, 
represents the structural connectivity of the system model. The values of A itself correspond to the effective connectivity within the system, i.e. the influence that the system elements exert over another (Friston, 1995) . Finally, the values of the matrix C in the second term of Eq. (7) represent the magnitude of the direct effects that external inputs (e.g. sensory information) have on particular system elements. In particular, by setting a particular parameter c ij to be zero, we disallow for any direct effect of the external input u j on x i (see Fig. 1 for a concrete example).
This classical model of a linear non-autonomous system with time-invariant parameters has found widespread application in various scientific disciplines (von Bertalanffy, 1969) . Natural phenomena that can be described by this kind of system include, for example, fill and depletion processes of biological storages, exponential growth and decay, and oscillatory processes (Bossel, 1992) . In section 6.4, we will see that dynamic causal modelling (DCM, Friston et al. 2003) extends the above formulation by bilinear terms that model contextdependencies of intrinsic connection strengths. In this paragraph, the variable names have deliberately been kept similar to those in DCM in order to facilitate the comparison (see Eq. 17). Finally, it should be noted that the framework outlined here is concerned with dynamic systems in continuous time and thus uses differential equations. The same basic ideas, i.e. that the evolution of a system's state is shaped by intrinsic interactions between system elements and external input,
can also be applied to dynamic systems in discrete time (using difference equations), as well as to 'static' systems in which the system is at equilibirum at each point of observation. The latter perspective, which is based on regression-like equations, is used by classic system models for functional neuroimaging data, e.g. psychophysiological interactions (PPI; Friston et al. 1997) , structural equation modelling (SEM; McIntosh et al. 1994; or multivariate autoregressive models (MAR; Harrison et al. 2003; Goebel et al. 2003 ). These will be described in section 6 and juxtaposed to DCM.
Practical implications for neuroimaging
These general Chawla et al. (1999) in whose fMRI study volunteers attended selectively to either motion or colour of a visual stimulus. Chawla et al. (1999) found evidence for a modality-specific gain control effect: attention to motion increased the amplitude of V5 BOLD responses to stimuli whereas attention to colour did the same for V4 responses. This figure shows a dynamic linear model of the neural system underlying the attentional effects observed by Chawla et al. (1999) . External inputs are represented by dotted arrows and structural connections are represented by solid arrows. Visual stimuli enter the system through primary visual cortex (V1) which is connected to both V4 and V5. Attention to colour (u 3 ) and attention to motion (u 2 ) are modelled to have direct effects on V4 and V5, respectively, as well as on an additional 'higher' area X (e.g. in parietal or prefrontal cortex) that is reciprocally connected with V4 and V5. Note that this model could replicate attention-induced signal increases in V4 and V5, both through direct and indirect (via the backward connections from X) effects. It could not, however, distinguish between gain control effects (increased responses to stimuli) and baseline shifts (increased signal during expectation of stimuli that have not yet appeared). ( B) The complete state equation of the model (compare Eqs 6 and 7 in the main text).
In order to save space, has been written as Ω i . Note that self-connections have been modelled for each area (diagonal entries in matrix A). In the absence of negative inputs, this allows the system to model the decay of induced activity.
dz dt i steps are required to characterize and understand SFRs in a given neural system. At the very minimum, identification of a neural system consists of at least the following steps.
Identification of candidate elements of the system.
The choice of necessary system elements is usually based on previous results from analytical procedures.
In neuroscience, potential system elements were traditionally identified by means of lesion studies or invasive recordings in animals, combined with microstructural investigations. With the availability of fMRI, conventional analyses using a General Linear Model (GLM) are ideal to inform this choice (see below). David & Friston, 2003, for an example). Implicitly, this decision thus concerns the resolution at which the system is investigated.
Choice of the state variables.
Together with the identification of system elements in step one, the choice of state variables determines the size and semantics of the state vector x.
Definition of a structural model and the assumed SFR.
This requires us to define the assumed connectional structure of the system (see the example in Fig. 1 ) and the mathematical form of the interelement dependencies f i . This step is crucial as it represents the hypothesis of how the functional behaviour of the system depends on its structure. It is obvious that the quality of the structural model depends on how well the structural connectivity is known for the particular neural system of interest. Because we usually deal with more than one experimental condition, the analysis is performed as a multiple linear regression, or equivalently, as an analysis of variance with indicator variables. These are all special cases of the GLM:
Choice of priors on the parameters.
which models voxel-specific BOLD responses y in terms of a linear combination of explanatory variables (columns of the design matrix X ) whose contributions are weighted by the parameter vector β, plus an independently and identically distributed Gaussian error term e. (Friston et al. 1994) . To account for variability in the HRF from voxel to voxel and subject to subject (Handwerker et al. 2004) , temporal basis functions can be used to express the predicted BOLD response as the linear combination of several functions of peristimulus time (Henson, 2004) , or the HRF can be estimated directly from the data (Marrelec et al. 2003) . to visualize the spatial distribution of significant effects.
Using a GLM in this fashion is equivalent to asking:
what are the brain voxels whose time series are correlated to a certain task component? In other words, the standard convolution model for fMRI is a tool to search for SFCs. This is not only true at a conceptual level, but also in a strict technical sense: whatever the specific statistical question asked by means of a contrast within the context of a GLM, it can be reformulated in terms of testing for partial correlations. This is because for any design matrix X with p columns and for a chosen contrast weight c, one can find a p × p matrix D such that Figure 2 illustrates this concept, using the same set of elements as in Fig. 1 to highlight the differences between a system model in analogy to a GLM and one that specifies the interactions between elements as well as the sites where external inputs enter the system. It is obvious that the system model in Fig. 1 has a much higher biological plausibility for describing a neural system in the brain than the model in Fig. 2 . This comparison serves to remind us that GLM-based approaches cannot deliver any mechanistic insights into systems as they are blind to both functional interactions and the spatial specificity of external inputs. They are, however, very useful to find candidate elements of a system that one wishes to characterize, particularly in cases where little a priori knowledge exists for that system.
Localizationism, functional specialization and functional integration
The simplest approach to interpreting SPMs of fMRI data is to take the perspective of localizationism. This approach assumes a one-to-one mapping between cortical areas and cognitive functions, a view that historically can be traced back to phrenology and has long been an important theme in neuropsychology (Phillips et al. 1984) . In the context of neuroimaging, localizationism predicts a one-to-one SFC, i.e. that there should be significant voxel-wise correlations between a BOLD time series and the cognitive function of interest within a single area only, and that this area should not show analogous correlations with any other cognitive function. This constellation is rarely, if ever, observed.
On the contrary, the general finding is that there exists a wealth of one-to-many and many-to-one SFCs across all cognitive domains (see , for reviews on this topic). One could argue that this is simply due to the coarse resolution of current psychological concepts and the ensuing con- Another piece of evidence against localizationism is given by disconnection syndromes in which local information processing in an intact area is altered when its input from remote areas is changed because of lesions in grey or white matter (Absher & Benson, 1993) . The cognitive function is implemented by the aggregate behaviour of the system depending on the neural context, i.e. the context-dependent interactions between the system components (McIntosh, 2000) . This perspective is also reflected in the well-known concepts of functional specialization and functional integration (Friston, 1995 (Friston, , 2002 . The functional specialization concept assumes a local specialization for certain aspects of information processing but allows for the possibility that this specialization is anatomically segregated across different cortical areas.
The great majority of current functional neuroimaging experiments have adopted this view and interpret the areas that are jointly correlated to a certain task component as the elements of a distributed system that represents the neural basis of the cognitive task.
However, this explanation is incomplete as long as no insight is provided into how the locally specialized computations are bound together by context-dependent interactions between these areas; this is the functional integration within the system. Methodologically, statements on functional specialization require voxel-wise statistical tests for the correlation between regional time series and task components; this is provided by GLM analyses. In contrast, functional integration within distributed neural systems is usually best understood in terms of effective connectivity. As described in section 3.2, effective connectivity is the influence that the system elements exert over another (Friston, 1995) .
It has been proposed that 'effective connectivity should be understood as the experiment-and time-dependent, simplest possible circuit diagram that would replicate the observed timing relationships between the recorded neurons' (Aertsen & Preißl, 1991) . This definition emphasizes that effective connectivity is contextdependent and rests on a causal model of the interactions. Importantly, functional specialization, assessed by GLM analyses, and functional integration, characterized in terms of effective connectivity, are not contradictory approaches, but complement each other:
whereas GLM analyses reveal candidate elements of a given system, models of effective connectivity can test hypotheses about the nature of the interactions between these elements and thus about functional principles of the system. As described in section 3.3, these two steps are essential procedures of neural system identification using neuroimaging.
It should be mentioned that, in addition to effective connectivity, another basic metric of functional integration exists, i.e. functional connectivity, which is defined as the temporal correlation between time series from different brain regions (Friston, 1995) . Analyses of functional connectivity do not incorporate any knowledge about the system structure and its hypothetical SFR. In this sense, functional connectivity approaches are model-free. Depending on the amount of knowledge about the system under investigation, this can either be a strength or a weakness. If the system is largely unknown, functional connectivity approaches are very useful because they can be used in an exploratory fashion, either by computing functional connectivity maps with reference to a particular seed region (Bokde et al. 2001; Stephan et al. 2001a; McIntosh et al. 2003) or using a variety of multivariate techniques that find sets of voxel time series that represent distinct (e.g. orthogonal or independent) components of the covariance structure of the data (McIntosh et al. 1996; Friston & Büchel, 2004) . The information from these analyses can then be used to generate hypotheses about the system.
On the other hand, if some information is available on the system structure and if there is a specific hypothesis about the SFR of the system, models of effective connectivity are usually more appropriate. This article deals with the question of how system models, based on hypotheses about structure and intrinsic mechanisms of the system, can be used to test hypotheses about SFRs, using neuroimaging data. The following sections therefore neglect functional connectivity approaches and deal with models of effective connectivity only.
Are system concepts taken seriously in neuroimaging?
At first sight, the system concept as it is expressed in the ideas of 'neural context' and 'functional specialization/ The second potential explanation is that there still is a certain lack of understanding as to what is needed to investigate and characterize a system properly. This may be due to the fact that traditional teaching curricula in many disciplines such as biology, medicine and psychology have rarely included a formal introduction to systems theory in the past. Although this is now starting to change (see below), the necessary methodological skills and concepts for exploring systems properly are not as widespread as one would hope. For example, a problem that is commonly encountered in neuroscience is the belief that a mere enumeration of the elements in a system conveys a basic understanding of its nature. One particularly salient example is the longstanding confusion about the definition of the 'limbic system': not only is there a large variety of different anatomical enumerations for this vague concept, but precise system models of how certain brain regions interact to mediate a certain function are almost absent (see LeDoux, 1991; Kötter & Stephan, 1997 , for reviews on this topic). This notion that a system is sufficiently described by a list of its constituent elements is also encountered in many neuroimaging studies. In these studies, the set of activated areas (the 'network') that is found in a particular analysis is taken as a satisfactory description of the system that mediates the cognitive function. In the discussion of these articles, the observed activation pattern is then often dissected into regional activations that are being assigned some particular subfunctionality within the system; this interpretation of individual network nodes relies on informal comparisons with other imaging studies and sometimes primate connectivity data, but is not based on any formal model. The danger of the widespread acceptance of this approach in neuroimaging is that it encourages experiments being performed in an entirely exploratory fashion without any precise a priori hypothesis about the system of interest. The results can be interpreted post hoc in the form of a story that explains how the observed activation pattern might have been produced by some underlying neural system. This criticism has been formulated previously, for instance by Kosslyn (1999) , and since then the overall quality of neuroimaging research has certainly improved, with a stronger emphasis on specific hypotheses and wider awareness of the importance of functional integration analyses. Still, as discussed above, only a minority of studies take a system-based perspective seriously. The third and final explanation offered for this is that there seems to be an implicit notion that functional maps from GLM analyses are sufficient to provide at least some general information about the interactions among the activated areas. This notion is revealed by a tendency to interpret 'co-activation' as evidence for some sort of co-operation within the same system: 'Sometimes researchers talk about a set of areas as a circuit, but this is usually misleading: in most studies all that is revealed are a set of activated (and /or deactivated) areas, with no information about the flow of information between the areas' (Kosslyn, 1999) .
Indeed, even in recent papers the finding that several areas are jointly correlated to some task component is still sometimes interpreted as a reflection of mutual correlation and thus of functional connectivity among the areas (e.g. Gold & Buckner, 2002; Dolcos et al. 2004 ).
A simple example demonstrates that this assumption about the transitivity of correlations is not always valid.
Let us imagine two regional BOLD time series, A 1 and A 2 (red and magenta lines in Fig. 3) , which have been acquired during a task that is described by the function T (blue line in Fig. 3 ). For simplicity, both BOLD time series and the task function are represented as sine waves of identical amplitude that simply differ in phase. If, for example, A 1 is shifted by -π/4 relative to T, the correlation between them is high: r(A 1 , T ) = 0.71.
If A 2 is shifted by the same amount but in the opposite direction (i.e. +π/4) relative to T, it shows exactly the same correlation with the task: r(A 2 , F ) = r(A 1 , F ) = 0.71. Therefore, in a GLM-based analysis, both A 1 and A 2 would appear in the same SPM as areas that are highly and identically correlated with the task. However, when testing for the correlation between the two time series, A 1 and A 2 are found to be entirely uncorrelated.
This can be easily seen from the fact that the correlation between two vectors is identical to the cosine of their angle, and the angle between two periodic functions of the same frequency corresponds to their phase Fig. 3 An example that transitivity of correlation does not generally hold. This example shows two fictitious regional BOLD time series, A 1 and A 2 (red and magenta lines), acquired during a task that is described by the function T (blue line). For simplicity, BOLD time series and the task function are represented as sine waves of identical amplitude that are shifted in phase. The y-axis represents BOLD signal amplitude and the x-axis represents time in multiples of π /2 (both axes: arbitrary units). A 1 is shifted by -π /4 relative to T, whereas A 2 is shifted by the same amount but in the opposite direction (i.e. +π / 4) relative to T. The correlation between the time series and the task function is high and identical for both areas: r(A 1 , T) = r(A 2 , T ) = 0.71. Therefore, in a GLM-based analysis, both A 1 and A 2 would appear in the same SPM as areas that are highly and identically correlated with the task. However, when testing for the correlation between the two time series, A 1 and A 2 are found to be entirely uncorrelated: r(A 1 , A 2 ) = 0 (see main text for details). difference (<A 1 , A 2 > denotes the dot product of the two time series vectors): (13) In summary, the finding of a set of areas to be jointly correlated to a certain task component (and thus 'co-activated') is not sufficient to demonstrate that these areas are functionally connected to each other nor does it characterize this system in any satisfactory depth: no insights are gained into the mechanisms that underlie the observed correlations between the local time series and the task component. Therefore, after one has identified candidate elements of the neural system by means of a GLM-based analysis, a subsequent analysis of their functional integration is required to provide a model for the SFR of the underlying neural system. This requirement was recognized very early in the history of neuroimaging, and considerable effort has been invested in establishing techniques that can be used for inferring principles of functional integration from neuroimaging data (e.g. Horwitz et al. 1984 Horwitz et al. , 1998 McIntosh et al. 1994 McIntosh et al. , 1999 Friston et al. 1997 Friston et al. , 2003 Friston & Büchel, 2000) .
Given the long history of these techniques for assessing connectivity within neural systems and the success of their applications, it is somewhat surprising that they are still playing a subordinate role in current neuroimaging studies. The following section summarizes the conceptual foundations of some of these methods and highlights their strengths and limitations.
Models of effective connectivity
As described above, functional integration within distributed neural systems is usually best understood in terms of effective connectivity. Effective connectivity aims to make statements about the influence that neural units exert on another, i.e. statements about causal effects. The fundamental problem is that all we have to The choice of the structural model is strongly hypothesis-driven. It is usually based on the results from conventional fMRI analyses to define the nodes of the modelled system and on data from neuroanatomical studies to define the connections. Because of the paucity of connectivity data on the human brain, the latter information usually has to be inferred from tract tracing studies in monkeys, a task that has been facilitated by means of large databases of published connectivity data (Stephan et al. 2001b) . In this article, we only deal with system models with very simple structural components, i.e. each element of the system represents the population activity of a whole cortical area; however, several large-scale models have been proposed recently that represent each area by multiple state variables representing, for example, different layers or distinct neuronal populations with different biophysical parameters (Robinson et al. 2001; David & Friston, 2003) .
The mathematical models of the assumed SFR reflect different ways of thinking how neural processes take place in the brain, e.g. whether they are linear or nonlinear and whether they are dependent or independent of history, time and context effects. Most of the models that have been proposed in the past are static linear models based on regression and covariance partitioning techniques, e.g. SEM (McIntosh et al. 1994; or MAR Göbel et al. 2003) . We briefly review and juxtapose these methods to the most recent approach, DCM, Non-mathematically inclined readers should go to section 7.
Structural equation modelling (SEM)
SEM has been an established statistical technique in the social sciences for several decades, but was only The statistical model of standard SEM implementations for fMRI data can be summarized by the regression-like equation
where y is an n × s matrix of n area-specific BOLD time series with s scans each, A is an n × n matrix of path coefficients (with zeros for non-existent connections), and u is an n × s matrix of zero mean Gaussian error terms, which are driving the modelled system ('innovations', see Eq. 15 below). Parameter estimation is achieved by minimizing the difference between the observed and the modelled covariance matrix Σ of the areas (Bollen, 1989) . For any given set of parameters, Σ can be computed by transforming Eq. (14): (15) where I is the identity matrix and T denotes the trans- These SEMs can then be compared to test for conditionspecific differences in effective connectivity (for examples, see Büchel et al. 1999; Honey et al. 2002 ). An Rowe et al. 2002 Rowe et al. , 2004 ; in this case, only a single SEM is fitted to the entire time series.
Multivariate autoregressive models (MAR)
In contrast to SEM, autoregressive models explicitly address the temporal aspect of causality in BOLD time series, focusing on the causal dependence of the present on the past: each data point of a regional time series is explained as a linear combination of past data points from the same region. MAR models extend this approach to n brain regions, modelling the n-vector of regional BOLD signals at time t ( y t ) as a linear combination of p past data vectors whose contributions are weighted by the parameter matrices A i :
In summary, MAR models directed influences among a set of regions whose causal interactions, expressed at the BOLD level, are inferred via their mutual predictability from past time points. Although MAR is an established statistical technique, specific implementations for fMRI were suggested only recently. Harrison et al. (2003) suggested an MAR implementation that allowed for the inclusion of bilinear variables representing modulatory effects of contextual variables on connections and used a Bayesian parameter estimation scheme (Penny & Roberts, 2002) . This Bayesian scheme also determined the optimal model order, i.e. the number of past time points (p in Eq. 16) to be considered by the model. A complementary MAR approach, based on the idea of 'Granger causality' (Granger, 1969) , was proposed by Goebel et al. (2003) . In this framework, given two timeseries y 1 and y 2 , y 1 is considered to be caused by y 2 if its dynamics can be predicted better using past values from y 1 and y 2 as opposed to using past values of y 1 alone.
The need for models of effective connectivity at the neural level
Both SEM and MAR have limitations. One disadvantage of SEM is that one is restricted to use structural models of relatively low complexity: models with reciprocal connections and loops often become non-identifiable or show unstable parameter estimates (see Bollen, 1989 , for details). However, there are heuristics for dealing with complex models that use multiple fitting steps in which different parameters are held constant while changing others (see McIntosh et al. 1994 , for an example). A second problem, as mentioned above, is that SEM is not a proper time series model. A third complication is shared by SEM and MAR: testing for context-dependent changes in effective connectivity becomes problematic in event-related designs. This is because of the transient nature of the evoked responses, which makes both partitioning of the time series (in SEM) and the use of bilinear modulation terms (in SEM and MAR) difficult (see Gitelman et al. 2003) . Finally, the standard formulations of SEM and MAR do not make use of our knowledge when external inputs (e.g. sensory stimulation) entered the system; instead, the driving inputs are random innovations (see Eqs 14-16). This is suboptimal for systems where we know the external inputs: for a causal description of the system dynamics, we need to describe (1) when and where external inputs enter the system and (2) how the initially induced activity then propagates through the rest of the system according to its connectional structure. However, there are ways of adapting both methods such that knowledge about the inputs is incorporated into the models (e.g. Harrison et al. 2003; Mechelli et al. 2002) .
Possibly the most important limitation of both methods, however, is a conceptual one. The causal architecture of the system that we would like to unravel is expressed at the level of the neuronal dynamics. However, the parameters in SEM and MAR are fitted to BOLD series, which result from a convolution of the underlying neural activity. Because this transformation of neural activity to BOLD has non-linear components Miller et al. 2001 (Yamashita et al. 2004 ). For fMRI, DCM ) is the only approach to date that marries models of neural dynamics with biophysical forward models.
Dynamic causal modelling (DCM)
DCM offers a simple model for the neural dynamics in a system of n interacting brain regions. It models the changes of a neural state vector z in time, with each region in the system being represented by a single state variable (see Eq. 17). These neural state variables do not map precisely onto some common neurophysiological measurement but represent a summary index of neural population dynamics in the respective regions.
The neural dynamics is driven by experimentally controlled external inputs that can enter the model in two different ways: they can elicit responses through direct influences on specific regions (e.g. evoked responses in early sensory cortices) or they can modulate the coupling among regions (e.g. during learning or attention). The changes of the neural states in time (i.e. the first derivative of the state vector z with regard to time t) are therefore a function of the states themselves, the inputs u and some parameters θ n that define the functional architecture and interactions among brain regions at a neuronal level (n in θ n is not an exponent but a superscript that denotes 'neural'):
Note that this equation has exactly the same form as the one that was introduced in the earlier section on general system theory (see Eq. 4) and on which many other system models have been based in the past (von Bertalanffy, 1950; Bossel, 1992) . Concerning the specific definition of F, the neural state equation in DCM uses a bilinear form:
Equation (18) is an extension of Eq. (7), which was introduced earlier for a general description of linear non-autonomous systems. Given this bilinear form, the neural parameters θ n = {A, B, C} can be expressed as Fig. 4 (A) Reformulation of the system model in Fig. 1 from the perspective of DCM. Here, attention to colour (u 3 ) and attention to motion (u 2 ) no longer have direct effects on V4 and V5, respectively, but modulate the strengths of the afferent connections to V4 and V5, respectively. Modality-specific modulation of the connections from V1 accounts properly for gain control effects, i.e. attention induces signal increases in V4 and V5 only in the presence of visual stimuli. In contrast, modality-specific modulation of the connections from the 'higher' area X (e.g. in parietal or prefrontal cortex) whose activity is directly influenced by attention independent of modality (see direct input att gen ) is a mechanism to represent baseline shifts, i.e. attention-induced signal increases in the absence of stimuli. 
The matrix A represents the effective connectivity among the regions in the absence of modulatory input, the matrices B j encode the change in effective connectivity induced by the jth input u j , and C embodies the strength of direct influences of inputs on neuronal activity (see and model complexity ).
Psycho-physiological interactions (PPIs)
PPI is one of the simplest models available to assess functional interactions in neuroimaging data (for details see Friston et al. 1997) . Given a chosen refer- The answer to the first question, the nature of the causal SFR expressed by models such as DCM, is related directly to the general state equation of dynamic systems (Eq. 4). System models in this general framework provide a causal description of how system dynamics results from system structure because they (1) have temporal precedence characteristics (embodied in the differential equations), (2) describe when and where external inputs enter the system and (3) state how changes in time induced by these inputs are determined by the system's structure, i.e. its connectivity pattern and any other time-invariant properties (e.g. time constants). With regard to temporal precedence, two details should be added: first, this principle is only partially embodied in a DCM because delays between areas are not modelled, and second, temporal relations between neural processes do not necessarily need to be reflected by analogous latency differences at the BOLD level. Instead, the information about neural activity that is reflected at the BOLD level is contained largely in the relative amplitudes and shapes of the haemodynamic responses, not in their timings (this is discussed in detail by Friston et al. 2003) . One of the strengths of the combined neural and haemodynamic model in DCM is that this information can be used to estimate connectivity parameters at the neural level that implicitly specify timing relationships not otherwise observable in the data. This is possible because DCMs have knowledge-based constraints on their architecture, in the form of Bayesian priors with different precision for neural and haemodynamic parameters .
With regard to the neurobiological interpretation of DCMs, they are obviously not specified at a level of Penny et al. (2004) and the discussion of the study by . The current limitations in temporal precision are likely to be overcome by extending DCM to other modalities like EEG and MEG in combination with more complex state equations that represent finer scales of cortical organization (David & Friston, 2003) .
With this discussion in mind, let us now turn to some practical examples of models of effective connectivity.
Given that DCM was introduced about a year ago, only a few applications have been published so far, most of which are of a methodological nature Mechelli et al. 2004; Penny et al. 2004 ). The following section therefore largely refers to classical models of effective connectivity such as SEM.
A classic PET study of effective connectivity in the visual system was performed by McIntosh et al. (1994) . A seminal fMRI study on top-down processes in the visual system was performed by , who examined the modulatory influence of attention on effective connectivity. In their experiment, the participants were shown a radially moving starfield stimulus. In one condition, they watched this stimulus passively while in the other condition they were instructed to pay attention to allegedly subtle changes in the speed of motion (which were actually absent). By comparing the 'attention' against the 'no attention' condition, showed that V5 responses to moving stimuli increased when these stimuli were attended to instead of being passively watched. This finding at the level of population dynamics was reminiscent of the well-known gain control effects described by invasive recording studies in monkeys where neural responses in visual areas increased during selective attention to specific properties of the stimuli (e.g. Luck et al. 1997) . However, the sources of this attentional top-down effect had remained largely unclear. Using a simple hierarchical SEM with psycho-physiological interactions, demonstrated that for attention to motion and at the level of cortical areas this effect could be explained by a modulation of the V1→V5 connections by the SPC, and by a modulation of the V5→SPC connections by the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).
Although their model does not detail the exact mechanism at the synaptic and microcircuit level underlying this modulation, it provides crucial constraints: the only neurobiologically plausible type of synaptic mechanism that could account for the model's behaviour at the population level is a change in the dendritic response properties of V5 neurons to inputs from V1 neurons, and this is likely to be mediated through axons from another area that target the same V5 neurons as the inputs from V1 (see Penny et al. 2004) . In spite of its simplicity, this model still provides one of the most compelling and anatomically precise suggestions of where and how attentional top-down influences occur in the visual system. Remarkably, these findings were confirmed in a series of subsequent analyses using a variety of different models of effective connectivity, including PPIs , Kalman filtering (Büchel & Friston, 1998) , Volterra series (Friston & Büchel, 2000) , MAR and DCM Penny et al. 2004 ).
Beyond the particular study by , the investigation of top-down effects has been a particular topic of interest for models of effective connectivity. Conventional neuroimaging studies of top-down effects like selective attention or maintenance of a particular cognitive set have consistently demonstrated the involvement of certain cortical areas, for example the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (e.g. Kastner et al. 1999; Ishai et al. 2000; Luks et al. 2002 ).
They could not, however, (1) disentangle the differential roles of the candidate source areas of top-down modulatory processes, (2) establish whether there was a single or multiple distinguishable modulatory process, or (3) clarify where the exact targets of the modulatory processes were located. For example, usually more than one putative source of top-down effects is found. Likewise, there is often more than one candidate target area where context-dependent changes in activity are observed. So how do these sources interact with each other and where and how do they modulate activity elsewhere in the brain? This question cannot be answered by conventional analyses, but, as demonstrated by The first example is an fMRI study on the mechanisms underlying hemispheric specialization . This study addressed the question of whether lateralization of brain activity depends on the nature of the sensory stimuli or on the nature of the cognitive task. For example, microstructural differences between hemispheres that favour the processing of certain stimulus characteristics and disadvantage others (Jenner et al. 1999 ) might mediate stimulus-dependent lateralization in a bottom-up fashion (Sergent, 1983) . On the other hand, processing demands, mediated through cognitive control processes, might determine in a topdown fashion which hemisphere takes precedence over the other in accomplishing a given task (Levy & Trevarthen, 1976; Fink et al. 1996) . To decide between these two possibilities, Stephan et al. (2003) used a protocol in which the stimuli were kept constant throughout the experiment, and subjects were alternately instructed to attend to certain stimulus features and ignore others. The stimuli were concrete German nouns (of four letters length each) in which either the second or the third letter was red. In a letter decision task, the subjects had to ignore the position of the red letter and indicate whether or not the word contained the target letter 'A'. In a visuospatial decision task they were required to ignore the language-related properties of the word and to judge whether the red letter was located left or right of the word centre.
The results of the conventional GLM analysis were clearly in favour of the top-down hypothesis: despite the use of identical word stimuli in all conditions, comparing letter to visuospatial decisions showed strongly left-lateralized activity, including classic language areas like Broca's area in the left IFG, whereas comparing visuospatial to letter decisions showed strongly right-lateralized activity in the parietal cortex. Yet it did not manage to clarify the actual mechanisms by which information processing was biased towards one hemisphere in a task-dependent fashion. The stimuli contained both letter and visuospatial information and thus required subjects to process only information that was meaningful for the current task and inhibit processing of any other information. Could this cognitive control process be the decisive 'switch' determining the relative involvement of the two hemispheres?
If so, it should lead to task-and hemisphere-specific changes in functional coupling between control areas in the frontal lobe and areas related to the execution of the tasks. Comparisons between the two tasks and a baseline condition (a simple reaction time task on the same type of stimuli) showed that the only putative control area was the ACC. This area showed increased activity in both hemispheres during both tasks (Fig. 5A) . However, when ACC connectivity with the rest of the brain was analysed, using a simple model of effective connectivity (PPIs; Friston et al. 1997 ), a striking hemispheric dissociation was found: left ACC specifically increased its coupling during letter decisions with the left IFG, an important language area (Fig. 5B) , whereas the right ACC specifically increased its connectivity during visuospatial decisions with areas in the right parietal cortex known to be involved in spatial judgments (Fig. 5C) . No other brain area showed significant task-dependent changes in coupling with either left or right ACC. Even though this analysis of effective connectivity did not detail the interactions between the areas involved in executing the two tasks, it provided a simple mechanistic description of the system that controlled the enhancement of activity in the taskrelevant hemisphere.
The second example of how system models based on effective connectivity can elucidate top-down mechanisms is an fMRI study by Rowe et al. (2004) . In this study, the authors examined the role of the DLPFC in free selection of a response among several options. The hypothesis was that DLPFC should be activated during free selection regardless of the modality of the selected item, but should convey the outcome of the selection process to modality-specific areas by means of modalitydependent changes in effective connectivity. This hypothesis was tested by contrasting selection tasks from two different domains: in a motor selection task, the participants could freely choose to press one of four buttons, whereas in a colour task, they could select one of four colours (and communicate this choice by button press). As a control, both tasks were supplemented by conditions in which the response was externally specified.
In the conventional GLM analysis the DLPFC showed higher activity during free than externally specified selections, regardless of modality. Examination of the interactions between the two factors 'selection' and 'modality' revealed that there was no prefrontal region that was specifically engaged in action selection only or colour selection only. However, using a simple SEM of the putative neural system including DLPFC, motor, parietal and prestriate areas, DLPFC connectivity was found to be significantly modulated by modality: during action selection, the DLPFC influence on the motor cortex increased, whereas during colour selection, Stephan et al. (2003) . (A) Brain areas that were significantly activated during both letter and spatial decisions (contrast between the letter decision task and the baseline condition, masked by the contrast between the spatial decision task and the baseline condition; P < 0.05 cluster-level corrected). The anterior cingulate cortex was bilaterally activated during both conditions. Coordinates of the local maxima (left ACC: −6/16/42; right ACC: 8/16/48; see cross-hairs) refer to the space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) and differ marginally from those reported by Stephan et al. (2003) since they resulted from a re-analysis of the data by a different software package (SPM2). (B) Results from an analysis of effective connectivity of the left ACC using psycho-physiological interactions (PPIs) with SPM99. Left ACC specifically increased its coupling with left inferior frontal gyrus during letter decisions (P < 0.05, small-volume corrected). (C) Results from an analysis of effective connectivity of the right ACC using PPIs (SPM99). Right ACC specifically increased its coupling with anterior and posterior parts of right intraparietal sulcus during spatial decisions (P < 0.05, small-volume corrected). DLPFC connectivity to prestriate areas (including the putative V4 region) increased. In addition, the modulation of connection strengths by modality was in itself modulated by the selection factor, e.g. the increase of the prefrontal-prestriate connection strength during the colour task was larger during free than during externally specified selection. Again, as in the examples above, the nature and topography of these complex top-down effects could not have been inferred from the GLM analysis but required a proper system model that allowed us to assess context-specific changes in connectivity.
With the advent of DCM, more sophisticated models of top-down and bottom-up processes have become possible (for example see Mechelli et al. 2004; Penny et al. 2004) . Another example from ongoing work at our laboratory is given in Fig. 4 , which shows how different types of top-down processes, i.e. gain control effects and baseline shifts, can be modelled using DCM.
This model also demonstrates an issue highlighted by Finally, I would like to comment on one particularly promising application of system models, i.e. the characterization of drug effects on connectivity. Given that many drugs used in psychiatry and neurology change synaptic transmission and thus functional coupling between neurons, a full understanding of their therapeutic effects cannot be achieved without models of how these drugs change the connectivity in neural systems of interest. So far, relatively few studies have studied pharmacologically induced changes in connectivity, ranging from simple analyses of functional connectivity (e.g. Stephan et al. 2001a) to proper system models, mainly based on SEM (e.g. Honey et al. 2003) .
As highlighted in a recent review by Honey & Bullmore (2004) , one particularly exciting option for the future is to use system models at the early stage of drug development in order to screen for substances that induce desired changes of connectivity in neural systems that are reasonably well understood.
Future clinical applications of neuroimagingbased system modelling
The rise of explicit system models in neuroimaging represents the beginning of a merging of the field with traditional modelling approaches in computational neuroscience. It can be expected that this trend will be considerably reinforced and accelerated during the next few years, fuelled by the need for mechanistic explanations of how cognition is mediated by neural systems and by the availability of more powerful modelling techniques. One particular line of progress is expected in the domain of MEG and EEG where neural mass models of measured responses will be able to exploit the temporal resolution of these techniques in order to analyse synchronization and coherence phenomena that are, at best, only indirectly accessible by fMRI (Robinson et al. 2001; Breakspear et al. 2003 Breakspear et al. , 2004 David & Friston, 2003) . Another important extension will be to join approaches that use predictions from computational models (e.g. temporal difference Rao & Ballard, 1999; Lee & Mumford, 2003) , ongoing work combines these models with modality-specific forward models that make it possible to fit them to measured EEG/MEG or fMRI data (Friston, 2004) .
A particularly exciting possibility is that these advanced models may once be used as diagnostic tools in a clinical context. This option seems particularly attractive for psychiatric diseases whose phenotypes are often confusingly heterogeneous due to strong interactions between genotype and environmental influences. One hope is that we may find diseasespecific endophenotypes, i.e. biological markers at intermediate levels between genome and behaviour (e.g. particular neurophysiological, neurochemical or endocrinological signatures). Such specific markers, if found, could allow for more precise categorization of patients and help to bridge the two distant levels of genetics and behaviour (Gottesman & Gould, 2003) . The endophenotype concept postulates that if a given psychiatric disease is indeed a homogeneous entity, its biological cause must be expressed at the level of a particular structure-function relation in the brain. Given the lack of focal structural changes in almost all psychiatric diseases, the biological cause therefore must reside in the dysfunctional structure of a particular neural system, i.e. in its connectivity. This 'disconnection hypothesis', which has received particular attention in the field of schizophrenia research (Friston, 1998) , has been investigated in various forms by a series of imaging studies (e.g. Friston et al. 1996; Stephan et al. 2001a; Lawrie et al. 2002) . Although robust connectivity differences have been reported by these studies for schizophrenic patients at the population level, connectivity parameters in classic system models like SEM have so far proved to be a poor predictor of genetic risk at the individual level (Winterer et al. 2003) . More promising results have recently been obtained in research on major depression where an SEM, fitted to PET data, has been presented in which a few parameters were sufficient to distinguish patients who responded to pharmacotherapy from those patients who responded to behavioural therapy (Seminowicz et al. 2004) .
The challenge will therefore be to establish neural systems models that are sensitive enough that their connectivity parameters can be used reliably for the diagnostic classification and treatment response prediction of individual patients. Ideally, such models should be used in conjunction with protocols that are minimally dependent on patient compliance and are not confounded by differences in performance, e.g. mismatch negativity protocols (Baldeweg et al. 2004) . Given established validity and sufficient sensitivity of such a model, one could use it in analogy to a biochemical laboratory test in internal medicine, i.e. to compare a particular model parameter (or combinations thereof) against a reference distribution derived from a healthy population. Such procedures could help to decompose current psychiatric entities like schizophrenia into subgroups that are characterized by common SFRs in the brain and may facilitate the search for genetic underpinnings.
